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Abstract 
 
This paper presents an estimation of the impacts of microcredit on labor and human capital 
following a quasi-experiment specifically designed to control for endogeneity and selection 
bias in the context of urban Mexico. We find important indirect trickle-down effects of credit 
through labor expenditure that benefit poor laborers; however, these effects were only 
observed when loan-supported enterprising households reached a level of income well 
above the poverty line. We also find significant, although small impacts of credit on 
children´s schooling that could be potentially reinforced by improvements in lending 
technology, school grants and additional ex-ante preventive and ex-post protective risk-
coping products. 
 
JEL Classification: C24; C25; C81; O16; O17; O18 
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Introduction 
 
The relationship between credit and labor is particularly important in the context of 
urban poverty. For the moderately poor and non-poor, income-generating activities are often 
important sources of income, whereas for the extreme poor, labor is, in many cases, the only 
source of livelihoods. Thus, by improving access to credit, a direct impact on labor intensity 
could be observed even beyond the household, with indirect impacts on poor laborers that 
are hired by loan-supported enterprising households. This can be crucial for the extreme 
poor, since in the urban context farming activities are rarely existent. Higher levels of labor 
intensity could, however, increase the propensity of child labor from young family 
members, and thus compromise wider impacts on human capital and long-run patterns of 
development. We explore all these wider impacts using data collected from households 
participating in three microcredit programs operating in Mexico. The paper is organized as 
follows: Section 1 presents the analytical framework where the relationship between credit 
and efficiency labor is analyzed. Section 2 describes the quasi-experimental research 
designed followed to control for endogeneity and selection bias, while in section 3 we 
discuss the econometric procedure to test for the underlying assumptions of no endogeneity 
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and selection problems. Sections 4 and 5 examine the impact of microcredit on labor 
intensity, and labor hiring, respectively, whereas section 6 analyzes the impacts on 
children´s schooling. Section 7 concludes with some policy recommendations. 
1. Credit and efficiency labor 
We begin the discussion by considering the case of an enterprising household engaged 
in an income generating activity that produces a market good y, based on a Cobb-Douglas-
type production function ( , )y f L K α= , where L  and K  are the quantity of labor and 
capital, respectively, and α  is a parameter of technology in the production of y. As pointed 
out by Pitt and Khandker (1998), it is very unlikely that at the bottom end of the income 
distribution α  changes, at least in the short-term. For that reason, we assume that 
technology remains constant, i.e. 1α = . 
In the production of y, the enterprising household will supply the amount of labor HL , 
restricted to a maximum of hours-work, h, conditional upon the number N of household 
members of working age i, in the form of [ ]
,
Max N ( )H
i h
L i h≥ . In this sense, under self-
employment, HL L= . Since we assume that α  remains constant, then an increase in the level 
of output, coming from a capital injection of a microcredit, will lead to an increase in labor 
intensity, which once reaching the maximum of HL , may lead to labor hiring. 
Note, however, that the demand for labor is not only a function of household income 
but also of the cost of labor. As pointed out by Leibenstein (1957); Mazumdar (1959) and 
Dasgupta (1993), labor efficiency is conditional upon factors such nutrition, abilities and 
efforts that determine labor productivity. Informational asymmetries may also play an 
important role in that process (see e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig 1996, and Bardhan and Rudra 
1986). Dasgupta and Ray (1986) have actually pointed out that at low levels of household 
income, even if an enterprising household wants to hire laborers, they soon realize that they 
can only afford to hire unskilled and malnourished laborers with very low productivity. 
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They may also perceive it to be very risky to employ workers for not having enough 
information about their skills, behavior or moral integrity. In the end, the enterprising 
household may simply decide to self-employ, leading to an increasing propensity of child 
labor from young family members, with negative impacts human capital and on long-run 
patterns of development. 
Thus, the cost of buying an efficiency unit of labor is given by / ( )w wµ λ= , where w  
is the wage rate, and ( )wλ  captures labor efficiency. Note that 0)(lim
)(/
=
∞→
λ
λ
f
ww
. Households 
will only consider hiring labor when they have reached a certain level of income, Y , where 
the cost of an efficiency unit of labor is at its maximum, i.e. max[ / ( )]w wµ λ= ii. The quantity 
of labor hired is measured by the expenditure on efficiency labor, ( )hL wλ , where hL  is the 
units of labor hired.  
At very low levels of household income, from 0 to Y  in the upper quadrant of figure 
1, no household hires workers given the high cost of buying an efficiency unit of labor (the 
area above µ ) and they remain self-employed, (from 0 to HL  in the lower quadrant). Once 
the enterprising household reaches the level of earnings Y , as a result of higher production, 
they begin hiring laborers with a minimum level of skills, abilities, and so on, that represent 
a maximum cost of efficiency labor, µ , that the household is willing to absorb. Thus, if µ  is 
affordable, then 0hL >  and H hL L L= + . Note that the further the distance from Y  to Y , i.e. 
the higher the household income, the lower the cost of buying additional efficiency units of 
labor µ , and thus, the higher the probability of reporting labor expenditure, ( )hW L wλ= . If 
by borrowing from a microcredit program, an enterprising household increases the 
probability of an income rise, then we may observe an indirect impact of credit on poor 
laborers whose skills and nutrition levels are improved by the fact of being employed by an 
enterprising household. This could potentially lead to improvements in labor efficiency. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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2. Research design 
In order to investigate the relationship between credit and labor, we designed a type 
of quasi-experiment that is often referred to as a non-equivalent, post test-only quasi-experiment 
(Campbell and Stanley 1966), in which two groups of households are sampled: treatment 
and control. A major problem that emerges with the non-equivalent, post test only quasi-
experiment, referred hereafter as quasi-experiment, is that these two groups may differ in 
important ways that influence the decision of borrowing and thus, the outcome of interest. 
In other words, there might be unobservable factors related to e.g. individual efforts, 
abilities, preferences and attitudes towards risk that cause a demand-related bias. A 
fundamental assumption here is that participation in a microcredit program is always 
voluntary. But even if we had a control group willing to take risks and borrow from a 
microcredit organization, we may still face selectivity discrimination made by the lender or 
group members that screen out applicants for e.g. living faraway from the place where the 
microcredit program operates, a supply-related bias.  
Although we did not observe households that chose either to participate or not, and 
households that were either accepted or rejected by the lender, we were able to specify the 
distribution of households that self-selected to participate in a microcredit program, and 
were accepted by the lender with a time-variance difference that accounts for the length of 
membership. Consequently, households who had self-selected to participate in a credit 
program and had been accepted by the lender, and therefore were actively borrowing from a 
microcredit program were eligible to be sampled as members of the treatment group. 
Similarly, households who had self-selected to participate in a credit program and had been 
accepted by the lender, but had not received a loan by the time the quasi-experiment was 
conducted, were eligible to be sampled as members of the control group.  
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We also followed a geographical criterion, i.e. we operationalised the quasi-experiment 
among households living in the same neighborhood, in areas with a minimum level of socio-
economic homogeneity, where the comparison between treatment and control groups was 
reasonable. By following this sampling strategy, it was possible to hold constant factors such 
as infrastructure, costs of inputs, and local prices that could cause, otherwise, an endogeneity 
problem. A high population density in poor urban areas made possible to follow this 
approach. As a result, we assume that the selection and endogeneity problems are controlled 
through the process of data collection itself. In section 3 we follow a specific econometric 
estimation procedure to test for such assumptions. 
Given the homogeneity of household characteristics, a sample survey was the 
preferred type of data collection (Babbie 1990). The sampling strategy was implemented 
using a multistage procedure in the form of clusters (Fink and Kosecoff 1985): first, we had 
access to a list of program participants (both treatment and control) from three case-study 
organizations (the clusters), and who lived in the selected areas. Participants with loan in 
arrears were included in the list. In the second stage, both treatment and control groups 
were selected at random. The survey was administrated face-to-face employing, as 
instrument of data collection, a semi-structured-interview formatiii.  
In the end, we surveyed 148 households: 55 participating at Community Financial 
Services (Fincomun) and living in San Miguel Teotongo, a neighborhood located to the 
eastern periphery of Mexico City; 46 participating at Centre for the Assistance of the 
Microentrepreneur (CAME) and living in the Chalco Valley, one of the most densely 
populated municipalities in the country located to the eastern periphery of the Metropolitan 
area of Mexico City; and 47 participating at Programs for Women (Promujer) and living in 
Tula City and the surrounding areas, a locality about two hours from Mexico City. Thus, we 
have three locations, one for each organization (see table 1 for more details). 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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3. Testing for selection bias and endogeneity 
 
Before analyzing the impact of microcredit on labor, we proceed to test for the 
underlying assumption of no selection bias. In order to do so, we initially considered a 
Heckman estimation procedure (Heckman 1979) with an identifying instrumental variable 
(IV)iv. This Maximum Likelihood method follows the model: 
 
 Li i L i iL X I uβ δ= + +   (1) 
 Ii i I i iI X Z uβ γ= + +  (2) 
 
where iI  is a dichotomous variable with value = 1I  for treatment households and = 0I  for 
the corresponding control group. Since both treatment and control groups are program 
participants with a time-variance difference that accounts for the length of membership, 
then 
 
( ) ( )( )
*
1 2 1 21 0
i
i i i i i
i
Z
E L I E L I X V
Z
φ γβ β σ
γ
= − = = − + +
Φ
 
(3) 
 
where ( )φ ⋅  and ( )Φ ⋅  are the density of the distribution function and the cumulative 
distribution function of the standard normal, respectively, and ( ) 0E V = . Note that 
*
2 1( )ε εσ σ σ= −  results from the covariance matrix derived in Maddala (1977) as follows:  
 
 
 
 
=  
 
 
11 12 1ε
12 22 2ε
1ε 2ε
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
σ σ 1
1i 2i iCov(u ,u ,ε )
 
(4) 
  
which enables us to measure the impact of program participation on the outcome of interest, 
iL  by comparing the expected outcome for treatment and control groups. If 
* 0σ > , then we 
encounter a significant selection problem.  
iL , which captures the number of units of labor invested per month by enterprising 
households, including labor-hiring, is in logarithmic form and coded as LGAGHOURSPM. 
iX  is a vector of household characteristics, and iZ  is an observable variable distinct from 
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those in iX  that affect iI  but not iL  conditional on iI , that plays the role of the identifying 
instrument (see table 9 for more details). The instrumental variable must be partially 
correlated with iI , i.e. the coefficient on iZ  must be nonzero, 0γ ≠ , so ( , ) 0Ii iCov Z u ≠ , 
while iZ  must be uncorrelated with iL , so ( , ) 0Li iCov Z u = , where the projected error, 
( ) 0LiE u =  is uncorrelated with iZ . Thus, selecting an appropriate instrument becomes a 
crucial and complex task for the estimation.  
The Heckman procedure (referred hereafter as Heckit) allows testing for the 
assumption of no self-selectivity by estimating the inverse Mills ratio, ( ) ( )( )
φλ ⋅⋅ ≡
Φ ⋅
, resulting 
from the relationship between the density of the distribution function, ( )φ ⋅ , and the 
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal, ( )Φ ⋅ . As suggested by Heckman 
(1979), we can estimate consistently the parameters Iβ  and γ  by exploiting the properties of 
the first-stage Probit estimation and then get the estimated inverse Mills ratio, λ
∧
. In the 
second-stage we obtain the parameters yβ  and δ  from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with 
the inverse Mills ratio added to the regressors as follows:  
L
i i L i iL X I M uβ δ λ= + + +  (5) 
 
The two-stage Least Square (2SLS) procedure yields consistent estimates in the 
parameter of interest δ  (Wooldridge 2002) where M and λ  are the inverse Mills ratio and 
its parameter estimate, respectively. A simple way of testing for selection bias is under the 
null hypothesis, 0 : 0H λ = , using the usual 2SLS t statistic. If 0λ ≠ , then the selection 
problem is significant. 
 Note that the slope coefficient δ  reports, in the Heckit, the average impact of 
program participation; however, it does not take into account the effect of borrowing over 
time. Treatment households with say five years of membership are expected to report 
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greater impacts than those households with just one or two years of membership. This is in 
part due to the effects of progressive lending, an incentive device extensively used by 
microcredit programs. In order to address this issue, we extend the Heckit procedure to a 
Tobit selection equation. We do so by replacing the treatment dichotomous variable iI  in 
equation (2) by a continuous variable, iC , that measures the amount of credit borrowed 
during the last credit cycle. We assume that iC  is exogenously determined by the lender who 
defines this maximum threshold according to level of participation in the program. Thus we 
have the following specification equation: 
* c
i i c i iC X Z uβ γ= + +    (6) 
where  *max(0, )i iC C= , i.e.  (7) 
* *
    if    0i i iC C C= >  (for treatment group) (8) 
*0      if    0i iC C= ≤  (for control group)  (9) 
and 2~ (0, )i iu X Normal σ  
 
Consequently, iC  takes a maximum value and a lower threshold zero in the form of a 
censored Tobit model (Tobin 1958) with a 0iC >  for treatment groups and 0iC =  for 
control groupsv. In this way we believe to capture a more precise measure of the impact of 
microcredit. Note that the Tobit model implies that the probability of observing 0iC >  and 
0iC =  are ( )φ ⋅  and *( 0) (0)ip C < = Φ , respectively, where ( )φ ⋅  and ( )Φ ⋅  denote the 
density function and the cumulative density function of the standard normal. These 
assumptions are very similar to those implied in the Heckit, but now the log-likelihood 
function takes the form 
 
0 0
ln ln ln ln 1
i i
i i c i c
C C
C X XL β βσ φ
σ σ> =
 −      
= − + + − Φ      
      
∑ ∑  (10) 
 
which generates the conditional mean function of the observed dependent variable iC  that 
is censored at zero for control groups and have disturbances normally distributed, which can 
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be used to estimate the determinants of the level of borrowing by treatment and control 
groups alikevi through the marginal effects of iX  on iC as followsvii: 
 
i i i c
c
i
E C X X
X
ββ
σ
∂     
= Φ  ∂  
  (11) 
 
This is actually the reason of using a Tobit specification equation. If no censoring had 
occurred, the Tobit model would be inappropriate (Maddala 1999). Thus, the borrowing 
function, on the one hand, takes the form:  
c
i c i c i i c iC X Z K uα β γ θ= + + + +  (12) 
 
where cα  is the intercept; cβ , γ  and cθ  are the unknown parameters, and ciu , the error term 
that captures unmeasured household characteristics that determine borrowing levels. The 
labor equation, on the other hand, conditional upon the level of program participation iC  
takes the form:  
L
i L i L i L i iL X K C uα β θ δ= + + + +     (13) 
 
where Lα is the intercept and Lβ , Lθ  and δ  are the unknown parameters, and Liu , the error 
term that reflects unmeasured determinants of iL  that vary from household to household. 
We have included in (12) and (13) a vector of credit market characteristics, iK , which 
captures the effects of other credit agents such as moneylenders and rotating savings and 
credit associations (ROSCAS) that actively compete with microcredit program. The rationale 
behind incorporating iK  relies on the principle that if we do not control for the effects of 
such agents on iL , then the parameter δ  may be inconsistent, i.e. we could wrongly 
attribute some outcomes to the microcredit program when in fact come from, for example, 
ROSCAS.  
Since iC  is included as the impact variable in (13), we need to identify an instrumental 
variable to control for policy-specifics that affect the credit equation but not the outcome of 
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interest. This instrument must satisfy the same conditions as in the Heckit in order to 
estimate the 2SLS Tobit procedure, the type of method that Amemiya (1984) refers to as Type 
III Tobit model. We derive that estimation equation as follows: 
i L i L i L i i iL X K C R eα β θ δ υ= + + + + +  (14) 
 
where iR  and υ  are the predicted Tobit residuals and its parameter estimate, respectively, 
and ( )L Li i i ie u E u R≡ − , where ( , )i ie R  are assumed to be independent of iX , i.e. 
( , ) 0i i iE e X R = . The predicted residuals from the Tobit equation are estimated when 0iC ≥  
in (12) and then included as another regressor in (14) to yield consistent and efficient 
estimators (Wooldridge 2002). The null of no selection bias is tested in similar fashion as in 
the Heckit; however, now we use the 2SLS heteroskedasticity-robust t statistic on the 
predicted residuals: when 0υ ≠ , a selection problem is encountered.  
3.1 Selecting the instrumental variable 
We have identified as the instrument a continuous variable (coded as DISTANCE) that 
captures the time participants spent since they left home (or business) until they arrived to 
the branch, and which is used as a proxy of accessibility to credit. Our argument relies on the 
idea that the correlation between program participation and accessibility emerges from two 
sources: 1) A process involving choice, where households reporting high transaction and 
opportunity costs of participation would either have high incentives to borrow the largest 
amount of credit, in order to compensate these costs, or simply drop out or not to participate 
in the first place. 2) Microcredit programs impose due to transaction costs implicitly related 
to monitoring and enforcement activities, lending restrictions to households living outside 
the branch’s operational radiusviii. 
When equation (12) was estimated with DISTANCE as the identifying instrument, the p-
values of the t statistic for the coefficient γ  rejected the null of 0 : 0H γ = , reflecting the 
statistically significance correlation between the level borrowing, iC  and the instrument in 
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iZ ; however, when iZ  was included in equation (13), the parameter estimate γ  accepted the 
null of no correlation against iL  (see table 2)ix. As a result, we were able to use DISTANCE in 
the Tobit selection procedure to test for the underlying assumption of no selection bias. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Note that the predicted residuals from the second-stage Tobit selection equation presented 
in table 3 (and coded as RESID) report insignificant levels in the parameter estimate υ , 
confirming, as in the parameter estimate λ  of the inverse Mills ratio in the Heckit procedure 
(coded as MILLS), the assumption of no self-selectivity. In this sense, the evidence suggests 
that increasing levels of borrowing are a function of policy-specifics that are exogenously 
determined by the lender. We found no evidence to imply that it is due to unobservable 
factors that are related to individual choice or preferences. 
In order to confirm the assumption of exogeneity, we exploit the qualities of the 
Hausman’s procedure (Hausman 1978) by testing under the null hypothesis that the 
asymptotic covariance matrix of the 2S-Tobit selection equation is not systematically larger 
than the OLS estimator. In order words, we examine under the null if lim  0p =d , where 
2b S Tobit OLSB−= −d , whereas under the alternative, lim  0p ≠d . Following Greene (2003:83) 
we compute the Hausman statistic in STATA as follows: 
{ } ( )1 22 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ' . . Var . . Var ( )dS Tobit OLS S Tobit OLS OLS S TobitH b B Est Asy b Est Asy B B b Jχ−− − −= − − −    →    
 
The computed Hausman statistic reports a very small value, 2 (13)χ = 0.63, suggesting that 
we cannot reject the null that the ˆOLSB  and 2ˆ S Tobitb −  are both consistent, and ˆOLSB  efficient 
relative to 2
ˆ
S Tobitb − . In this sense, by following a geographical criterion during the process of 
data collection, we were able to control for local factors that could potential cause an 
endogeneity problem, allowing us to concentrate on the OLS results discussed below.  
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4. The impact of microcredit on labor intensity 
 
As both the units of labor, iL , and the maximum amount of credit, iC , are in logarithmic 
form, the parameter estimate δ  measures the elasticities of (latent) units of labor in hours 
invested with respect to credit. The slope coefficient reports a positive sign and statistical 
significance at the 5%, although the magnitude of the impact appears to be small. More 
precisely, the econometric results suggest that if the maximum amount of credit had gone up 
by one percent, the units of labor invested is predicted to increase in the order of 0.029%, 
ceteris paribus. 
For comparative purposes, we have estimated equation (13) with iI  in substitution of 
iC , where iI  is the same dichotomous variable used in the Heckit procedure that takes the 
value = 1I  for treatment households, and = 0I  for the corresponding control group. In this 
case, the coefficient of δ  reports the difference in the mean log of units of labor, which can 
be used to estimate the percentage change of units of labor invested by treatment 
households relative to the control group. In order to do so, we follow Halvorsen and 
Palmquist (1980) and take the antilog of δ  to obtain 0.233( ) 1.2624e = , suggesting that the 
median of units of labor invested by treatment households was higher than that of the control 
groups by about 26%, ceteris paribus. 
We are also interested in examining the impacts of credit over time. This is particularly 
important due to the fact that microcredit programs extensively use progressive lending as 
an incentive device to mitigate moral hazard and reduce operational costs in the long run. 
Our survey collected data about the length of membership, which measures the 
number of years of program participation. This variable (coded as MEMBERSHIP) takes a 
value 0iM >  for treatment households and 0iM =  for control groups. However, since we 
expect iM  to be correlated with the upper limits of progressive lending, we have included 
iM  in equation (13) in substitution of iC , where the parameter δ  now captures the semilog 
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of units of labor invested with respect to the length of membership. In other words, the slope 
coefficient of iM  measures the constant proportional or relative change in the number of 
units of labor invested for a given absolute change in the length of program participation. 
The results from the estimation equation with iM  as the impact variable are presented 
in table 3. The coefficient δ  reports statistical significance at 1%. Other things held constant 
at the mean, the number of units of labor invested is predicted to increase at the annual rate 
of 9.2% after joining the microcredit program. In order to estimate the rate of growth over 
the period of time that treatment households had participated in the credit program, we 
compute the compound rate of growth using the antilog of δ  as follows: [(antilog(δ )-1)x100]. 
Our results predict a compound rate of annual growth in units of labor invested in the 
order of 9,6%, which is slightly higher than that of 9.2% obtained from the instantaneous 
estimation. Note that the value reported from the constant is equal to 6.2. Since the constant 
reflects the log of units of labor invested at the beginning of program participation, then by 
taking the antilog of 6.2, we can estimate the average number of hours invested by control 
households. We predicted this value at approximately 499 hours per month. In this sense, 
after one year of program participation, an average household would be able to increase the 
number of units of labor invested in income-generating activities from 499 to 547 hours per 
month. Our results clearly reflect the involvement of more than one household member in 
income-generating activities, which as discussed in section 1, could potentially have 
negative impacts on children´s schooling, or after reaching certain income levels, go beyond 
the boundaries of the household, and indirectly benefit poor laborers. We examine in section 
5 the indirect impacts on labor hiring before analyzing the impact on children’s schooling in 
section 6. 
5. Indirect impacts on labor hiring 
 
Our sample survey collected a continuous variable, iW  that captures information 
about labor expenditure. This variable, which is coded as WAGEXP, is essentially the 
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product of the number of units of labor hired by the enterprising household and the wage 
rate per unit of labor, i.e. ( )hW L wλ= x. In an earlier examination of WAGEXP, we found 
that a large percentage of participating households did not hire labor. In fact, just about 15% 
of the sample did actually employed laborers. In this sense, we had two groups of 
households: one reporting a maximum level of labor expenditure, and another consisting of 
households that did not report information on labor expenditure. Thus, the continuous 
variable iW  takes a maximum value and a lower threshold zero in the form 
*max( ,0)i iW W= , 
where *i iW W=  if 
* 0iW >  i.e. if households report labor expenditure, and 0iW =  if 
* 0iW ≤ , 
i.e. if households do not report labor expenditure. Since we have a censored sample, we 
decided to follow a Tobit specification equation (Tobin 1958) in the form:  
 
* w
i w i w iW Y uα β= + +   (15) 
 
 where iY  is a continuous variable that measures household income, and wβ  and wiu  are the 
slope coefficient and the error term, respectively. Since we have a data-censoring case 
demanding the latent variable *iW  to follow a homoskedastic normal distribution, we have 
transformed WAGEXP into logarithmic form (coded as LGWAGEXP) to make this 
assumption more reasonable. Note that this model contains similar characteristics of the 
first-stage Tobit selection equation previously specified in equation (6), where the 
probability of observing 0iW >  and 0iW =  are ( )φ ⋅  and *( < 0) (0)ip W = Φ , respectively, 
and where ( )φ ⋅  and ( )Φ ⋅  denote the density function and the cumulative density function 
of the standard normal.  
The reason of following a standard Tobit specification equation comes from the fact 
that we are interested in analyzing the conditional mean function of the observed dependent 
variable iW  that is censored at zero for enterprising households with no labor-hiring, and 
with disturbances normally distributed. The use of OLS for the sub-sample for which 
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* 0iW > would have produced an inconsistent estimator wβ  since we are using only the data 
on uncensored observations, causing a downward bias result (Greene 2003).  
As both labor expenditure and household income are in logarithmic form, the 
parameter estimate β  in equation (15) measures the elasticity of latent expenditure on 
efficiency labor with respect to household income. In an attempt to capture any direct 
relationship between labor hiring and credit, equation (15) was estimated with the logarithm 
of the maximum amount of credit borrowed, iC  in substitution of iY , as explanatory 
variable. In this case, the slope coefficient measures the elasticity of labor expenditure with 
respect to credit. For comparative purposes, we also included, separately, iI  and iM  in 
substitution of iC  in order to examine any direct impact of program participation, and the 
length of membership, respectively, on labor expenditure. The results from the Tobit 
equations are presented in table 4.  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Although the coefficient of iC  reports a positive sign, we did not find any evidence to 
confirm a direct impact of credit on labor expenditure. The same statistical insignificance was 
found when equation (15) was computed with iI  and iM , as the impact variables. We find, 
however, a large elasticity of labor expenditure with respect to household income. Other 
things held constant, a one percent increase in the level of household income was predicted 
to give rise to a 7.8 percent in labor expenditure, which supports the hypothesis of an indirect 
impact of credit through an income rise. The large elasticity can be explained by low initial 
wages relative to household income. If by borrowing capital, enterprising households 
manage to increase the level of household income, then an increasing probability of labor 
expenditure is observed. Although the computed elasticities derived from the Tobit equation 
give us interesting information about the large responsiveness of the labor expenditure-
income relationship, it does not tell us at what level of income enterprising households 
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actually hire labor. In order to estimate this income level, we transform the logs of iW  and iY  
into linear variables and then computed equation (15) accordingly. The results are presented 
in figure 2. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The slope coefficient β  now reports the predicted values of an absolute change in iW  
conditional upon an absolute change in iY . As we hypothesize graphically in figure 1, at low 
levels of income, no household will hire workers given the relative high cost of buying 
efficiency units of labor, and they remain self-employed. Our estimations suggest that after 
reaching a minimum level of income, Y , predicted to be in the order of 18,700 pesos or 
about 1700 dollars per month, enterprising households begin to consider hiring labor. After 
point Y , which we envisage as a platform for employment generation, the propensity of labor 
expenditure becomes positive and significant: a one-peso increase in the level of household 
income was predicted to give rise 29 cents in labor expenditure, ceteris paribus. 
Note that the estimated income of the employing household is well above the 
capability-based poverty line derived by Sedesol (2002) for urban poverty in Mexicoxi. It seems 
that at low levels of income, the cost of hiring units of efficiency labor is too high, either due 
to low levels of productivity or informational asymmetries. Mosley and Rock (2004:477) have 
reported qualitative evidence from Africa showing poor enterprising households being 
reluctant to hire workers due to “a very considerable perceived risk associated with the initiation of 
financial relationships going outside the family”. In our study, narrative evidence shows that 
labor hiring also emerges when the supply of labor from household members reaches its 
maximum (point HL  in figure 1). Take the following case:  
Mr A lives with his mother and two younger sisters in San Miguel Teotongo, in the 
Iztapalapa District. He has a small grocery shop located in a neighborhood about 40 minutes 
from his place of residence. He is the only source of household income since his sisters are 
students, and his mother, responsible for housework and other chores. As a competitive 
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strategy, he decided to offer late opening hours that became afterwards a 24-hours service, 7 
days a week. At nights, the main selling products are beer, spirits and food. In order to 
attend the grocery shop throughout the night, he hired two waged-workers. He pays 850 
pesos each (some US $76) for about 40 hours per week. This about 2.2 times the estimated 
capability based poverty line estimated for urban areas in Mexico.  
Based on the data reported by Mr. A, we estimate an average household income in the 
order of 1728 US dollars per month, which after weighted by equivalence factors (see 
Rothbarth 1943), yields an income per adult equivalent 3.15 times the capability based 
poverty line. When we asked Mr. A. the reasons for employing laborers he said: “The 
business has been growing and I wanted to open the shop longer hours but I cannot work 24 hours, 
you know. My sisters and my mother cannot help me either. It is too risky to work at nights. That is 
why I decided to hire my employees...” Interview: Int2-01302004. 
Although we find no evidence of labor hiring below the capability-based poverty line, 
we did find that 27% of the hired laborers were below a food-based poverty line derived by 
Sedesol (2002), which identifies extreme deprivation in urban areas, and almost 60% were 
below an asset-based poverty line, which has been derived to measure moderate poverty. 
The empirical evidence also reports important differences between treatment and 
control households in relation to the wage paid to laborers relative to the poverty lines. For 
analytical purposes, we focus on the capability-based poverty line. While laborers hired by 
treatment households received a wage 25% above the poverty line, the corresponding 
control groups paid a wage far below that threshold of deprivation (about 64.4%). It would 
seem that there is a positive impact of program participation on laborers’ welfare. Evidence 
from a cross-tabulation show a statistical significant association at the 0.05 level between 
treatment and control groups in relation to the units of labor hired, measured in hours per 
week. Workers employed by treatment households worked on the average 34 hours per 
week vis-à-vis 19.7 hours reported by workers employed by control households (see table 5). 
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This could ultimately benefited poor laborers.  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
5.1 Labor intensity vs. labor efficiency  
 
The difference in the wage rate reported in table 5 could also be due to efficiency 
factors. We remind the reader that labor expenditure, W , is given by the product ( )hL wλ , 
where hL  is the number of units of labor hired, and ( )wλ  measures labor efficiency. 
Therefore, by deriving the elasticity coefficient ( / ) /( / )h hdW W dL L , we can get a linear 
parameter estimate from (ln ) / (ln )hd W d L , and then estimate a relative change in labor 
efficiency, ( )d wλ . If the computed elasticity is greater than one, then an efficiency factor 
might be driving up the wage rate.  
Consequently, we estimate the predicted elasticity coefficient by computing the 
regression equation h wi w i w iW L uα β= + +  on the observed values, iW . The regressor 
h
iL  is a 
continuous variable that captured the number of units of labor hired (in hours) per month. 
This variable is transformed into logarithmic form and coded as LGHOURSLABPM. As both 
labor expenditure, iW , and units of labor hired, 
h
iL , are in log form, we are able predict the 
relative change in labor efficiency.  
The results from the regression equation report an elasticity in the order of 1.19 and 
statistically significant at 1% level (t–statistic= 5.73, p= 0.00)xii. Our findings suggest that 
enterprising households not only increase labor expenditure as a consequence of higher 
levels of labor intensity, but also due to efficiency factors. Unfortunately, given data 
restrictions, we were unable to determine whether wage differences emerged as an indirect 
effect of program participation or simply because better off households were able to hire 
relatively more skilled workers. We speculate the former given the proximity of the 
predicted elasticity to the unity, although more research will be needed to confirm such 
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supposition. In the following section, we examine the impact of microcredit on children 
schooling. 
6. The impact of microcredit on children´s schooling 
The examination of the impact of credit on children schooling is particularly relevant 
in the context of the income-human capital relationship that affects children´s future 
earnings. Our argument relies on the strong and positive association between children’s 
schooling and future levels of labor productivity (see e.g. Spence 1973 and Schultz 1988). On 
the one hand, if rising levels of labor intensity, as a result of participating in a microcredit 
program, increase the propensity of child labor from young family members, then long-run 
patterns of development could be seriously compromised. On the other hand, if access to 
credit plays the role of an ex-post risk-coping mechanism against idiosyncratic income 
variability and transitory external shocks, then an indirect impact on children’s schooling 
could be observed, with long-run effects on labor productivity, and the poverty trapxiii.   
The particular characteristics of the education system in Mexico, where primary and 
secondary instruction are free of tuition fees, complicated the use of household expenditure 
on formal education as a variable to fully capture the level of households´ investment in 
human capital. In fact, the use of such a variable would have only accounted for seasonal 
expenditure on uniforms, shoes or stationery. For that reason, we decided to concentrate on 
a qualitative response variable (coded as SCHOOLING) that captures household decisions of 
whether or not stop sending their children to school. We considered children aged 5 to 17 
from the sampled households at the time the survey was conducted. The nature of this 
variable allows us to predict the propensity of children’s dropouts by the estimation of a 
probit model (Goldberger 1964) in the form: 
*
i i ic X uβ= +  (16) 
 
which is based on an underlying response variable *ic  that takes the values 1c =  if 
* > 0ic , 
i.e. if household i decides to stop sending their children to school; and 0c =  otherwise. 
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Equation (16) is defined by the probability function 
 
Prob ( ) ( )iXi i ic = 1 X t dt X
β φ β
−∞
= Φ∫( ) =  (17) 
 
where the observed values captured in c  follow a binomial distribution with probabilities 
depending on iX . In other words, we assume that at least a group of independent variables 
in iX  explain the decision to stop sending children to school. In order to derive the marginal 
effects of model (16), we estimate the effect of one unit change in the explanatory variables 
on the probability of children´s dropouts as follows: 
 
 
( 1) ( )i i
i i
P c XME
X X
β∂ = ∂Φ
= =
∂ ∂
  (18) 
 
where the rates of change are computed in STATA at the means of the independent 
variablesxiv. We have included in (16) the same vector of credit markets characteristics, iK  
and the impact variable, iC , just as derived earlier in equation (12) to get: 
 
 
c
i c i c i c i ic X K C uα β θ δ= + + + +     (19) 
 
where the slope coefficient δ  measures the impact of a relative change in the units of capital 
borrowed on the propensity of children´s dropouts. Note that a negative sign in δ  is expected if 
positive impacts of microcredit are the desirable goal. We have estimated equation (19) with 
iI  and iM  in substitution of iC  where δ  captures, in the case of the former, the impact of 
program participation on the school enrolment status, whereas in the case of the latter, the impact 
of one additional year of program participation on the propensity of children’s dropouts. As we 
expected, the slope coefficient δ  reports a negative sign in each of the impact variables (see 
table 6).  
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
Other things held constant at the mean, the marginal effects of a one percent increase in the 
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amount of credit borrowed was predicted to decrease the probability of children’s dropouts 
by about 0.023 percentage points. Similarly, when equation (19) was computed with I
 
as the 
impact variable, treatment households reported, on the average, a 25% lower probability of 
withdrawing their children from school relative to the corresponding control group. 
Additionally, when equation (19) was computed with M as the impact variable, we find that 
the marginal effect of one additional year of participation in a microcredit program was 
predicted to decrease the probability of children’s dropouts by about 0.040 percentage 
points, ceteris paribus. This relatively small impact may reflect three different phenomena:  
1) The presence of a short-run opportunity cost of school enrolment that increases 
once children get older and are able to generate income. If by borrowing from a microcredit 
programme, households manage to increase labor intensity (as reported in section 4), then 
an increased propensity of employing units of labor from young family members may be 
observed. In that context, access to credit, in combination with other policies such as cash 
grants to poor children conditional on school attendance, could substantially reduce 
negative long-run impacts of credit on human capital. 
2) A substitution effect that has been reported by Pitt and Khandker (1998) in the 
context of Bangladesh. This substitution effect could emerge between parents’ and children’s 
time in self-employment activities and group meetings. If by borrowing from a microcredit 
program women spend several hours in periodical group meetings, then the oldest 
children’s time may be used to substitute the time women’s withdraw from childcare or 
productive activities. In this sense, institutional efforts aimed to reduce the time-intensity of 
group lending technology could have important long-run impacts on human capital. 
3) The effect of idiosyncratic income variability and transitory external shocks. When a 
household experiencing a sudden destabilizing event chooses to borrow additional money 
from, say, the local moneylender, this decision may prevent parents withdrawing their 
children from school in the short-run, although may actually increase the probability of 
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children’s dropouts in the long-run. 
An interesting structural property of equation (19) with M  as the impact variable is 
that allows us to estimate the predicted probabilities of children´s dropouts by different 
groups of households, overtime. To illustrate this, consider the following cases: Group 1 is 
formed of women borrowing only from a microcredit program. Group 2 is formed of women 
borrowing from a microcredit program and participating in rotating credit and savings 
associations (ROSCAS). Group 3 is formed of women borrowing from a microcredit program 
and other lenders such as savings and credit co-operatives and moneylenders 
(FORMALCREDIT and MONEYLENDER, respectively). Finally, group 4 is formed of women 
borrowing from a microcredit program, other lenders and participating in ROSCAS (see 
table 7). 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
We have computed equation (19) employing the four groups of female borrowers and 
holding the rest of the variables at the mean. The slope coefficient reports the predicted 
probabilities of children’s dropouts for an absolute change in the length of program participation. 
The results are shown in figure 3. As we expected, the slope coefficient shows a negative 
sign for each group of female borrowers, reflecting an inverse relationship between the 
length of program participation and children’s dropouts; however, the magnitude of the 
impact is substantially different between groups, depending on the level of women’s 
indebtedness. For instance, women with one year of program participation and borrowing 
only from a microcredit program (group 1) report a decreasing predicted probability of 
children’s dropouts in the order of Pr( 0.23 1)i iy M= =  relative to Pr( 0.27 0)i iy M= =  of the 
control group, whereas women in the same category but with 5 years of membership 
reported a much lower probability Pr( 0.10 5)i iy M= = . We observed a very similar pattern 
in group 2, where women combined a microcredit with voluntary savings at rotating 
savings and credit associations.  
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INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
On the contrary, women borrowing from both a microcredit program and other lenders, with 
no participation in ROSCAS (group 3) have a much higher probability of withdrawing their 
children from school. We estimate that by borrowing from a moneylender, women increase 
the probability of children´s dropouts up to 75% ceteris paribus, and although this probability 
falls overtime, the negative impact remains considerable high even after 5 years of program 
participation, Pr( 0.50 5)i iy M= = . 
In this sense, institutional efforts aimed to design ex-post protective risk-coping products 
such emergency loans and insurance schemes could have important impacts on human capital. 
Moreover, ex-ante preventive services, additional to voluntary savings schemes, aimed to 
improve financial literacy could reduce the propensity of households falling into a cycle of 
debt. Although experimentation and analysis will be needed to identify costs and benefits of 
policies of this kind, it is clear that benefits from financial literacy may go well beyond the 
expected rate of loan default. 
7. Conclusions and policy recommendations  
Our study has given important insights on the dynamics involving the relationship 
between credit and wider impacts on labor and human capital, with important implications 
for policy and institutional design: poverty targeting, either due to donors conditionality or 
organizational goals, is a common practice in microcredit to ensure that credit delivery 
reaches the intended beneficiary. This is done through indirect mechanisms such as upper 
limits on progressive lending or rigid monitoring devices such as periodical repayment 
schedules in group meetings that often keep out better off households from borrowing. 
However, the evidence suggests that poverty targeting may actually diminish important 
trickle down effects through labor markets that could indirectly benefit poor laborers. Once 
enterprising households reach a minimum threshold of income, estimated at a level 
approximately three times as high as the poverty line derived for urban poverty in Mexico, 
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the marginal propensity to hire units of labor increased significantly. We envisage that 
income level as a platform for employment generation. This platform is particularly important 
in the context of urban poverty, where farming activities are practically non-existent and 
labor usually represents the only income source for the extreme poor.  
In this sense, by simply opening up the upper limits of progressive lending, 
microcredit programs could significantly increase the probability of achieving wider impacts 
through labor markets. As Mosley and Rock (2004:481) have pointed out “this opens up the 
possibility that […] poverty impact may be maximized by targeting microfinance on the vulnerable 
non poor, allowing the labor market to assume the brunt of the poverty reduction job”. 
The evidence also suggests that the rigidity of monitoring devices such as periodical 
repayment schedules in group meeting may prevent borrowers to invest more units of labor 
and consequently, diminish the propensity of labor intensity. The time-intensity of such 
peer-monitoring devices may also exacerbate the substitution effect between parents’ and 
children’s time in self-employment activities and group meetings, with adverse impacts on 
children´s schooling and long-run effects on human capital. In this sense, any possible policy 
action directed to cut down time in group meetings, through improvements in the prevailing 
lending technology and practices could have significant wider impacts on human capital. In 
that course, experimentation should be encouraged, and perhaps facilitated by 
governmental agencies and other donors, to improve market efficiency and poverty impacts, 
through a number of possible policy actions that we summarize in table 8.  
Expanding access to credit (and other financial services) is, beyond all doubt, critical 
for the poor. However, design factors can constrain the magnitude of the expected impacts. 
In that context, we hope that our findings will serve as stimuli to the microcredit industry to 
explore other possible ways to improve practice and increase impact. In that effort, both 
institutions and households win, and the orthodox hypothesis of divisibility between equity 
and efficiency simply collapses. 
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Notes 
                                                 
i Contact at: University of Sheffield. 9 Mappin Street, S1 4DT Sheffield, United Kingdom. Tel: 
+44 114 222 3343, Email: m.nino@sheffield.ac.uk  
ii This maximum is the upper limit of the cost of buying an efficiency unit of labor that an enterprising 
household is willing to pay. 
iii For more details about the instruments of data collection, contact the authors at 
m.nino@sheffield.ac.uk 
iv See Wooldridge (2002), Greene (2003) and Maddala (1999) for a detailed discussion on the properties 
of the identifying instrument. 
v Since we have a data-censoring case demanding the variable 
*
iC to follow a homoskedastic normal 
distribution, we use a logarithmic transformation in our estimation strategy to make this assumption 
more reasonable. 
vi For further details on the derivation of the conditional mean functions, see Greene (2003). 
vii McDonald and Moffitt (1980) have decomposed equation (7.21 into two parts to obtain the effects of 
a change in iX  on the conditional mean of iC , and on the probability that the observation will fall in 
the part of the distribution where  0iC > . 
viii In fact, we observed that mean value for this time-dimensional variable was 22 minutes for an 
outward journey. 
ix We adopted Lawrence Klein’s rule of thumb (1961), to test DISTANCE for potential problems of 
collinearity. We did not find evidence of collinearity. 
x Since we cannot observe λ, we assume that this factor is captured by the wage rate w. 
xi The poverty line at household level has been set up at 6570 pesos per month, which is the product of 
the capability-based poverty line at 1507.5 per month multiplied by household size using the 
equivalence factors proposed by Rothbarth (1943). 
xii The statistics of the regression equations are: F(1, 20) = 32.81, p = 0.00; R2 = 0.52 
xiii A poverty trap emerges under situations where, on the one hand, wealthy households can afford to 
invest in human capital, e.g. in education, health and nutrition, and this enables them to increase their 
future productivity and wealth. On the other hand, poor households cannot afford to invest in human 
capital and as a consequence, earn low income and remain in poverty. The relationship between 
imperfect credit markets and the poverty trap has been analyzed by Ljungqvist (1993). 
xiv For a discussion of the derivation of the marginal effects for a probit equation see Greene (2003), 
Maddala (1999) or Wooldridge (2002). 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the case-study microcredit programmes 
Information corresponding to 2004 
Institutional  FINCOMUN CAME PROMUJER 
Type of organisation Credit Union 
Non-Governmental 
Organisation 
Non-Governmental 
Organisation 
Year of 
establishment 
1994 1991 2001 
Founders 
Juan Diego Foundation, a 
catholic group 
Foundation for Community 
Assistance, belonging to the 
Archdiocese of Mexico 
Pro-Mujer International 
Area of influence 
San Miguel Teotongo, and 
other municipalities in the 
metropolitan area of Mexico 
City 
The Chalco Valley and a 
few other municipalities of 
the metropolitan area of 
Mexico City 
Tula City and the 
surrounding areas in the 
state of Hidalgo 
No of branches 27 5 21 
Personnel 339 580 45 
Lending 
methodology 
Individual lending Credit-only village-banking Credit-plus village-banking 
Repayment 
schedules 
16 to 24 weekly instalments 
at Fincomun officers or 
HSBC branches 
16 weekly instalments in 
compulsory group 
meetings. 
12 to 24 weekly or 
fortnightly instalments in 
compulsory group 
meetings 
Interest rate (per 
annum) 
72% 60% 72% 
Savings as % of loan 10 10-12 10-12 
Physical collateral Yes No No 
Guarantees Yes, two guarantees Yes, through joint liability Yes, through joint liability 
Other services 
Voluntary savings products 
and certificates of deposits 
Life Insurance to cover loan 
balance. Extra-loans from 
the internal revolving fund 
Training in financial 
literacy, business 
development and health 
care 
Borrowers (000) 25.8 40 11.8 
Women  
borrowers (%) 
60 80 100 
Gross loan portfolio  
(000 MEX$) 
169,725 58,000 13,739 
Average outstanding 
loan (000 MEX$) 
6.6 1.5 2.1 
Loan loss reserve 
ratio (%) 
2.7 1.8 2.9 
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Table  2. Testing the identifying instrument DISTANCE for the Heckit and Tobit selection equation 
Dependent variable in equation (12): logarithm of the maximum amount of credit borrowed (LGMAXCREDIT) 
Dependent variable in equation (2):  The Heckman procedure transforms LGMAXCREDIT into a dummy variable for 
treatment group = 1 if > 0I  
Dependent variable in equation (13): Logarithm of units of labour invested during the last month (LGAGHOURSPM) 
Explanatory Variables 1S-Heckit 
(Eq. 2) 
1S-Tobit 
(Eq. 12) 
2SLS 
(Eq. 13) 
DISTANCE 0.028 0.095 -0.004 
 (5.08)*** (3.69)*** (1.48) 
AVEDU -0.053 -0.215 -0.041 
 (1.44) (1.26) (2.37)** 
HOWNER 0.252 1.548 0.196 
 (0.99) (1.25) (1.45) 
HESTATE 0.449 2.153 -0.004 
 (1.58) (1.50) (0.03) 
TIMEBUS 0.001 0.014 0.023 
 (0.06) (0.14) (2.25)** 
WWORKER -0.157 -0.772 -0.423 
 (0.95) (0.91) (3.77)*** 
DEPENDRATIO 0.200 0.961 0.783 
 (0.35) (0.34) (2.52)** 
AGE -0.015 -0.064 -0.016 
 (1.11) (1.00) (2.12)** 
WOMAN 0.185 0.831 -0.278 
 (0.69) (0.62) (2.22)** 
MARITAL -0.093 -0.466 -0.037 
 (0.33) (0.35) (0.24) 
ROSCAS 0.155 0.629 0.061 
 (0.67) (0.56) (0.48) 
FORMALCREDIT -0.558 -2.506 -0.017 
 (1.30) (0.98) (0.09) 
MONEYLENDER -1.101 -5.879 -0.032 
 (2.87)*** (2.69)*** (0.19) 
CONSTANT -0.072 2.159 6.427 
 (0.08) (0.51) (16.07)*** 
Observations 148 148 137 
Pseudo 
2R / 2R  0.1553 0.0394 0.25 
Wald 
2χ / LR 2χ / F stat 37.97 27.93 4.21 
Prob > 
2χ  / Prob > F 0.0003 0.0093 0.0000 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table  3. The impact of credit on labour intensity 
Dependent variable:  Logarithm of units of labour invested during the last month (LGAGHOURSPM) 
Impact variables: Logarithm of the maximum amount of credit (LGMAXCREDIT), and Length of membership in 
years (MEMBERSHIP) 
 Heckit OLS 2S-Tobit OLS OLS 
AVEDU -.066 -0.034 -0.031 -0.033 -0.035 
 (2.46)** (1.95)* (1.82)* (1.96)* (2.17)** 
HOWNER .290 0.163 0.139 0.151 0.096 
 (1.35) (1.22) (1.04) (1.13) (0.71) 
HESTATE -.132 0.012 0.004 0.014 -0.022 
 (0.59) (0.08) (0.03) (0.09) (0.14) 
TIMEBUS .035 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.023 
 (2.06)** (2.32)** (2.24)** (2.31)** (2.25)** 
WWORKER -.359 -0.405 -0.396 -0.404 -0.397 
 (2.37)** (3.71)*** (3.60)*** (3.73)*** (3.69)*** 
DEPENDRATIO .874 0.827 0.816 0.830 0.821 
 (1.94)* (2.70)*** (2.71)*** (2.73)*** (2.84)*** 
AGE -.012 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.017 
 (1.27) (1.76)* (1.66)* (1.74)* (2.18)** 
WOMAN -.125 -0.281 -0.269 -0.271 -0.311 
 (0.57) (2.31)** (2.20)** (2.23)** (2.51)** 
MARITAL .024 0.011 0.027 0.015 -0.017 
 (0.12) (0.07) (0.18) (0.10) (0.11) 
ROSCAS .135 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.022 
 (0.76) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.18) 
FORMALCREDIT .269 -0.031 -0.015 -0.025 -0.022 
 (0.64) (0.17) (0.08) (0.13) (0.11) 
MONEYLENDER -.363 0.062 0.106 0.062 0.032 
 (0.83) (0.37) (0.59) (0.37) (0.20) 
LGMAXCREDIT† 0.143 0.233    
 (1.47) (1.86)*    
LGMAXCREDIT   0.014 0.029  
   (0.63) (2.11)**  
MEMBERSHIP     0.092 
     (2.90)*** 
MILLS .639     
 (1.60)     
RESID   0.017   
   (0.83)   
CONSTANT 4.47 5.974 5.917 5.944 6.212 
 (4.16)*** (14.34)*** (14.18)*** (14.23)*** (16.65)*** 
Observations 137 137 137 137 137 
Pseudo R2 / R2  0.26 0.27 0.26 0.28 
Wald χ2  / LR χ2 / F stat 41.92  4.08 4.50 4.97 
Prob >  χ2   / Prob > F 0.0183  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Robust z- and t -statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
† LGMAXCREDIT has been transformed into a dummy variable for treatment group = 1 if > 0I  to follow the 
Heckman procedure. 
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Table 4. Determinants of labour expenditure 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of household expenditure on labour (LGWAGEXP) 
LGHINCOME 7.777    
 (2.80)***    
LGMAXCREDIT  0.225   
  (0.68)   
MEMBERSHIP   0.300  
   (0.40)  
LGMAXCREDIT †    1.122 
    (0.37) 
Observations 148 148 148 148 
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.019 0.006 0.005 
LR chi2 9.84 0.47 0.16 0.14 
Prob > chi2 0.0017 0.4929 0.6884 0.7107 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
† LGMAXCREDIT is transformed into a dummy variable = 1 for treatment households 
 
 
Figure 2. The relationship between household income and labour 
expenditure (Figures in pesos of 2004)
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Table 5. Relationship between programme participation and labour  
 Treatment  
 
Control 
 
Self-employed per household (average)  1.60 1.35 
Self-employment as % of income sources 75.39 69.37 
Labour-hirers as proportion of total borrowers (%) 15.56 13.79 
Labourers per household-hirer (average)  1.5 1.3 
Average hours worked per week 34+++ 19.72 
Wage paid as % of the food-based poverty line (784.5 pesos per month) 240.39 123.70 
Wage paid as % of the capability-based poverty line (1507.5 pesos per month) 125.10 64.37 
Wage paid as % of the asset-based poverty line (1881 pesos per month) 100.26 51.59 
The statistically significant association in the cross-tabulations are indicated by the Chi-square values 
 for the cell as a whole at 0.001 (+); 0.01 (++); 0.05 (+++); and 0.1 (++++) levels of significance. 
Source. Authors´ sample survey 2004 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
 
18700Y =
Capabilities-based poverty line 
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Table 6 Probit estimation: The impact of programme participation on children schooling 
Dependent variable: dummy variable = 1 if household i has stopped sending children to school (SCHOOLING) 
 Equation  (19) with Ci as 
explanatory variable a/ 
Equation  (19) with Ii as 
explanatory variable b/ 
Equation  (19) with Mi as 
explanatory variable c/ 
 Coef ∂Φ
∂X  
Coef ∂Φ
∂X
 
Coef ∂Φ
∂X  
AVEDU -0.066 -0.019 -0.068 -0.020 -0.055 -0.016 
 (1.64) (1.64) (1.68)* (1.68)* (1.39) (1.39) 
HOWNER -0.317 -0.096 -0.336 -0.101 -0.269 -0.082 
 (1.14) (1.14) (1.21) (1.21) (0.97) (0.97) 
HESTATE 0.279 0.075 0.286 0.077 0.276 0.076 
 (0.92) (0.92) (0.93) (0.93) (0.90) (0.90) 
TIMEBUS 0.026 0.008 0.026 0.008 0.026 0.008 
 (1.39) (1.39) (1.41) (1.41) (1.29) (1.29) 
WWORKER 0.418 0.121 0.420 0.121 0.445 0.130 
 (2.42)** (2.42)** (2.42)** (2.42)** (2.55)** (2.55)** 
DEPENDRATIO 0.312 0.090 0.320 0.092 0.244 0.071 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.40) (0.40) 
AGE 0.024 0.007 0.024 0.007 0.029 0.009 
 (1.70)* (1.70)* (1.70)* (1.70)* (1.99)** (1.99)** 
WOMAN 0.301 0.082 0.325 0.088 0.327 0.090 
 (0.98) (0.98) (1.05) (1.05) (1.12) (1.12) 
MARITAL -1.169 -0.395 -1.186 -0.400 -1.065 -0.360 
 (4.04)*** (4.04)*** (4.07)*** (4.07)*** (3.79)*** (3.79)*** 
ROSCAS 0.032 0.009 0.050 0.014 0.039 0.011 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.19) (0.19) (0.15) (0.15) 
FORMALCREDIT 0.237 0.074 0.238 0.074 0.211 0.066 
 (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.51) (0.51) 
MONEYLENDER 0.930 0.330 0.887 0.312 1.075 0.387 
 (2.45)** (2.45)** (2.35)** (2.35)** (2.90)*** (2.90)*** 
LGMAXCREDIT -0.082 -0.024 -0.824 -0.251   
 (2.74)*** (2.74)*** (3.05)*** (3.05)***   
MEMBERSHIP     -0.135 -0.040 
     (1.88)* (1.88)* 
CONSTANT -0.883  -0.823  -1.506  
 (0.88)  (0.82)  (1.55)  
Observations 148 148 148 148 148 148 
LR Chi-squared 39.31 39.31 40.37 40.37 37.28 37.28 
Pseudo R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.26 
Log likelihood -62.23 -62.23 -61.46 -61.46 -64.20 -64.20 
Robust z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a / Ci: logarithm of the maximum amount of credit borrowed (LGMAXCREDIT) 
b/ Ii: LGMAXCREDIT is transformed into a dummy variable = 1 for treatment households 
c/ Mi : number of years of programme participation (MEMBERSHIP) 
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Table 7: Female borrowers by different source of funding  
 Control group Treatment group 
Group 1 Savings at home, and occasional loans 
from relatives, friends or suppliers, i.e. 
0MEMBERSHIP = , 0iROSCAS = ,  
0iFORMALCREDIT =  and 
0iMONEYLENDER =  
Only loans from MFI  i.e.  
0iMEMBERSHIP > , 0iROSCAS = , 
0iFORMALCREDIT =  and 
0iMONEYLENDER =  
Group 2 Savings in rotating savings and credit 
associations and occasional loans from 
relatives, friends and suppliers 
0MEMBERSHIP = , 1iROSCAS = , 
0iFORMALCREDIT =  and 
0iMONEYLENDER =  
Loans from the MFI and savings in rotating 
savings and credit associations, i.e. 
0iMEMBERSHIP > , 1iROSCAS =  
0iFORMALCREDIT =   and 
0iMONEYLENDER =  
Group 3 Loans from institutional lenders and 
moneylenders. Probably savings at home, 
i.e. 0MEMBERSHIP = , 0iROSCAS = , 
1iFORMALCREDIT =  and 
1iMONEYLENDER =  
Loans  from the MFI, and institutional 
lenders and moneylenders, i.e. 
0iMEMBERSHIP > , 0iROSCAS =  , 
1iFORMALCREDIT =  and 
1iMONEYLENDER =  
Group 4 Loans from institutional lenders and 
moneylenders and saving in rotating 
savings and credit associations, i.e. 
0MEMBERSHIP = , 1iROSCAS = , 
1iFORMALCREDIT =  and 
1iMONEYLENDER =  
Loans from the MFI, and institutional 
lenders and moneylenders, and savings in 
rotating savings and credit associations, i.e. 
0iMEMBERSHIP > , 1iROSCAS =  
1iFORMALCREDIT =  and 
1iMONEYLENDER =  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Predicted probabilities of children’s dropouts per length of programme participation 
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Table 9. List of variables 
Impact variables Definition Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
LGMAXCREDIT Logarithm of the maximum 
amount of credit borrowed in the 
last credit cycle  
148 5.475 4.466 0 10.621 
LGMAXCREDIT† If household has been treated = 1 148 0.608 0.490 0 1 
MEMBERSHIP Years of membership 148 1.704 1.944 0 8 
Dependent variables       
LGAGHOURSPM Logarithm of hours of labour 
invested in production, including 
labour hiring 
148 5.169 1.653 0 7.352 
LGWAGEXP Logarithm of household 
expenditure on labour-hiring per 
month 
148 1.107 2.672 0 8.556 
SCHOOLING If household has stop sending 
children to school = 1 
148 0.270 0.446 0 1 
LGHINCOME Logarithm of household income 
per month 
148 8.697 0.537 7.244 10.254 
Independent variables       
Contained in iX        
AVEDU Years of education  148 7.047 3.777 0 17 
HOWNER If household owns residence = 1 148 0.682 0.467 0 1 
HESTATE If house is still in construction = 1 148 0.791 0.408 0 1 
TIMEBUS Years in business 148 5.162 5.746 0 30 
WWORKER Number of household members 
with a waged job 
148 0.547 0.703 0 3 
DEPENDRATIO Dependency ratio (number of 
children, students and old 
members / household size) 
148 0.498 0.222 0.125 1 
AGE Age of borrower 148 42.189 10.846 19 74 
WOMAN If borrower is woman = 1 148 0.730 0.446 0 1 
MARITAL If borrower is in a relationship = 1 148 0.757 0.430 0 1 
Contained in iL        
ROSCAS If borrower participates in rotating 
savings and credit association = 1 
148 0.453 0.499 0 1 
FORMALCREDIT If borrower have received loans 
from institutional lenders = 1 
148 0.054 0.227 0 1 
MONEYLENDER If borrower have received loans 
from moneylenders 
148 0.095 0.294 0 1 
Instrumental variable       
DISTANCE Distance from branch to place of 
residence or business (in minutes) 
148 32.365 21.716 10 100 
 
 
 
 
